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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. : 
Case No. 20060710-CA 
RAYMOND CHARLES MARQUEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his convictions based on conditional guilty pleas to unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) (West 2004), and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-
free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58~37a-5 & 58-37-8(4) 
(West 2004). Jurisdiction exists pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue L Was a weapons frisk of defendant justified, where he was discovered inside 
a home being legally searched for a wanted fugitive and the police reasonably suspected he 
was the fugitive or the fugitive's accomplice? 
A trial court's factual findings underlying its determination of reasonable suspicion 
are reviewed for clear error; its application of law is reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, \ 15, 103 P.3d 699. 
Issue II Was defendant's arrest justified when he admitted that drug paraphernalia 
was in his pocket and the paraphernalia was then seized? 
A trial court's ultimate determination of probable cause is reviewed for correctness. 
See State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App 291, 15,141 P.3d 602 (citing Brake, 2004 UT 95, \ 15). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Defendant bases his challenge on the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, which reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession and/or use of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of section 58-
37-8(2)(a) & (4), and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of sections 58-37a-5 & 58-37-8(4) (R. 1). 
Defendant moved to suppress the drugs and drug paraphernalia found on his person 
(R. 10-11). Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 17-20, 
21-24,27-28,68). See Addendum A (Memorandum Decision Denying Motion to Suppress). 
On July 3, 2006, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to possession of 
methamphetamine, reduced to a third degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, 
a class A misdemeanor (R. 44-51). On July 17, 2006, defendant was sentenced to zero-to-
2 
five years imprisonment on the felony and a concurrent term of one year imprisonment on 
the misdemeanor, with both sentences concurrent to a third sentence of imprisonment in 
another case (R. 53). Defendant timely appealed (R. 57). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Raymond Gerrish was running—running from the police and Adult Probation and 
Parole [AP & P]. He was wanted for two alleged crimes: absconding from AP & P5s 
supervision and felony drug possession (R. 73). See Addendum B (First Search Warrant & 
Affidavit). He needed to hide. He decided to go to Shawn Cloward5s place in Helper, Utah 
(id.). Cloward lived in a single-wide two-bedroom mobile home [house], but also had a 
camper-trailer [RV] on the property, which could provide a second place to hide (R. 73; R68: 
7). Gerrish trusted others on the property to warn him if the wrong person approached. Cf. 
Add. B. He figured the set-up was perfect—well, at least, until January 29, 2005. 
That day, the wrong person saw him. An unidentified confidential informer saw 
Gerrish several times on January 29th and each time Gerrish was attempting to conceal 
himself in Cloward5 s house and RV (R. 73). The informant realized Gerrish was hiding from 
the police (id.). The informant immediately contacted the Helper City police, who also 
"received information that there are suspects acting as lookouts5' on the property (id.). See 
Add. B (Affidavit). 
JThe facts are recited in the "light most favorable to the trial court's findings" and 
ultimate ruling. State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App. 96, \ 2 n.l, 89 P.3d 185 (citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
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The police immediately secured a search warrant for the house and RV (id.). Given 
Gerrish's fugitive status, his new felony charge, his intentional concealment, and the reported 
presence of lookouts/accomplices on the property, the police were concerned for their safety. 
Judicial permission was given for them to enter the property at night "for the safety of the 
officers" so that their movements would be less detectible (id.).2 See Add. B (Affidavit). 
That night, around 9:20 p.m., approximately ten officers from Helper City, Carbon 
County, and AP & P, approached Cloward's (R68: 4, 6, 12-13). The officers separated into 
two groups: one surrounded the house and the other surrounded the RV (R68: 6). 
Officers Anderson and Wood approached the house (R68: 6,23). Anderson knocked 
on the front door, yelled "police" several times, and demanded entry (R68: 6). No one 
responded (id.). With guns drawn, Officers Anderson, Wood, and three others entered the 
home (R68: 6, 26). 
They immediately encountered three males and one female (R68: 6-7, 10). Officer 
Anderson recognized one of the males, Rick Cloward, who was seated on a couch in the 
living room (R68: 6-7,15, 19). Anderson did not know the other two males or if either was 
Gerrish (id.). Officer Wood did not know any of the males or whether any of the them were 
Gerrish (R68: 27, 31).3 See also Add. A (Trial Court's Findings at R. 27). 
2The trial court found that the search warrant was valid. See Add. A. Defendant 
does not challenge this ruling on appeal. 
3Raymond or Ramon Gerrish is 5' 9", weighs 151 pounds, has hazel eyes and 
brown hair, and was born in 1982 (R. 73; R68: 6). See Add. B (Warrant & Affidavit). 
Defendant, Raymond Marquez, is 5? 8", weighs 160 pounds, has brown eyes and brown 
hair, and was born in 1967. See Fingerprint Sheet contained in Pleadings File, Case No. 
20060710. 
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Wood immediately confronted one of the males, later identified as defendant, standing 
near the kitchen sink (R68:23). In the initial seconds, Wood was not sure "what the situation 
was inside the house" and suspected that if defendant was the fugitive or an accomplice, he 
was likely armed with a knife or gun (R68: 27-28, 31). To protect himself and the other 
officers, Wood ordered defendant to the floor, handcuffed him, and frisked him for weapons 
(R68: 27-28, 31). In patting him down, Wood felt a hard bulge in defendant's right front 
pocket (R68: 24, 28-29). Worried that the bulge might be a hypodermic needle that could 
poke him, Wood asked defendant what was in his pocket (R68: 24, 27). Defendant 
volunteered, "paraphernalia" (id.). Wood then reached into the pocket and removed a five-
to-six inch long hypodermic needle and a metal spoon of about the same length (R68:24-25). 
The spoon contained methamphetamine residue (R68:25). 
Still suspecting that defendant was Gerrish or one of his accomplices, Wood asked 
him his name (R68: 27, 31-32).4 See also Add. A (Trial Court's Findings at R. 27). 
Defendant responded, "Raymon Marquez," which was later confirmed to be true (R68: 29, 
31).5 Wood arrested defendant for possession of drug paraphernalia (R68: 33). 
4The search warrant identified Gerrish as the fugitive and then referred to unnamed 
other suspects, who were acting as lookouts (R. 73). See Add. B. Wood testified he did 
know, at the time of the frisk who was who or "what the situation was in the house" (R68: 
27, 31). The trial court found that at the time of the frisk, "it was not known whether 
[defendant] was the subject of the first search warrant" (R. 27). See Add. A. In context, 
the testimony and finding support that Wood did not know if defendant was Gerrish or 
one of Gerrish5 s lookout/accomplices. 
following defendant's arrest, Officer Anderson searched defendant's wallet, 
which presumptively contained identification (R68: 29-31). 
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While Officer Wood dealt with defendant in the kitchen, Officer Anderson 
simultaneously approached the third male, later identified as Gerrish, who was in the hallway 
(R68: 6-8, 14-15, 18, 31). Officers Wood and Anderson were in two different rooms and 
could not see what the other was doing (id.). Consequently, Wood did not know what 
transpired between Anderson and Gerrish in the bedroom until after Wood frisked and 
questioned defendant in the kitchen (id.). See also Add. A (Trial Court's Findings at R. 27). 
When Anderson first observed Gerrish in the hallway, Gerrish and the female, later 
identified as Sylvia Marquez, were walking backwards, "back peddling, basically," towards 
the bedroom (R68: 6-7, 19). Sylvia was screaming and yelling (R68: 17, 19-20). As they 
reached the bedroom, Anderson could see methamphetamine pipes in plain view on a table 
next to the bed (R68: 7, 15, 18). He ordered the two to the ground, but only Gerrish 
complied (R68: 19-20). Sylvia just continued to yell (id.). For the moment, Anderson 
ignored her, turned to Gerrish, and asked him his name (R68: 19). Gerrish lied and said he 
was "Michael Anderson" (R68: 15, 19). Anderson did not know Gerrish by sight, but 
suspected this was a lie and again asked him who he was (id.). This time, Gerrish gave his 
true name (id.). Anderson picked Gerrish up off the floor, arrested him on the outstanding 
warrants, and handed him to another officer (R68: 19). Anderson's encounter with Gerrish 
lasted only five or so seconds (id.). 
Anderson stayed in the bedroom (R68: 19-21). Now that he was done with Gerrish, 
he turned to Sylvia, who was "hysterical" and still screaming and refusing to lay on the 
ground (id.). Anderson felt her behavior was a threat to himself and the safety of the other 
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officers and handcuffed her (id.). No more than 30-40 seconds had passed since the police 
entereu ii- . . = . . » . " • 
In the same minute, other officers detained and handcuffed Cloward in the living room 
where a marijuana bong was in plain view (R68: 6-7, 14 45, 20-21, 23, 31-32; R. 74). 
In detaining the home's occupants, the officers observed drugs and drug paraphernalia 
•; ;•!.* - view "all over tl v K »•.« • ' *>*!••• exception of tl le kitcl i "i l (id.) \ n officer left to 
obtain a second search warrant to search the home for additional drugs and evidence of drug 
sales (R68: 7. 1 5 " 1 ; T? ^ See Addendum C (Second Search Warrant & Affidavit). 
Clow.r ;^ - - . ,\ v.- c .K-ui!iu\t [viiuin..; ihc arrival H ihe second search warrant (7<i>> 8-
9, 12). Gerrish and defendant were placed in police vehicles *m- :;-;mspo- .- - 1, 
19, 32-33). Five minutes had passed since the police entered the home (R68: 33). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defers1 .• : ' 1 '• ' " • ' - - :..; : < , : ^ j 
armed and dangerous and, therefore, the frisk for weapons violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Defendant further argues that the evidence which flowed from the allegedly illegal frisk, that 
^ ...Smi-sion v possessed drug paraphernalia MK: me paraphernalia itself, must be 
suppressed. If suppressed, defendant asserts there is no evidence to si • - >i. 
While the outcome of this case turns on the legality of the weapons frisk, the legality 
: .; u : -k depends on the facts. Here, however, defendant has not properly marshaled the 
facts si ipporting 1 he legality < : »f 1 he ft isk and tl ic dei lial of 1  lis mc rtion to suppress. 
Consequently, defendant's arguments should be summarily rejected. 
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Alternatively, even if the merits are considered, reasonable suspicion supports the 
frisk. The police faced a dangerous situation in arresting a wanted fugitive in a private home, 
where the fugitive was reported to have accomplices. In the initial minute following their 
entry into the home, the police reasonably suspected that defendant could be the fugitive or 
his accomplice. Given this reasonable suspicion, it was also reasonable for them to suspect 
that he was armed and dangerous and, consequently, to frisk him for weapons to ensure their 
safety. Because the weapons frisk was lawful, defendant's admission that the bulge in his 
pocket was drug paraphernalia supports his arrest. The ultimate seizure of the paraphernalia 
occurred incident to that arrest. In sum, the trial court properly denied the motion to 
suppress. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REASONABLE SUSPICION SUPPORTED A WEAPONS FRISK OF 
DEFENDANT WHERE THE POLICE LAWFULLY ENTERED A 
PRIVATE RESIDENCE TO ARREST A WANTED FUGITIVE AND 
SUSPECTED THAT DEFENDANT WAS THE FUGITIVE OR HIS 
ACCOMPLICE 
Defendant asserts that no reasonable suspicion supports the weapons frisk. See Brief 
of Appellant [Br.Aplt. ] at 7-11. According to defendant, "[n] either the search warrant nor the 
arrest warrant, including the underlying crime for which a warrant was issued, indicate that 
Mr. Gerrish [the subject of the search warrant] was a violent individual or that there was an 
inherent or specific risk of violence to the officers charged with executing the search 
warrant." Br.Aplt. at 10. Additionally, defendant claims he was a "compliant visitor," who 
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presented no threat to the officers once he was handcuffed. Br.Aplt. at 11. Consequently, 
defendant ai gues the frisk was illegal, 
Defendant's arguments ignore the facts ui linb ca -a :ir>.l Minimi * !l : 'l 
Because defendant fails to properly marshal the record facts, his claim of illegality should 
be summarily rejected. See United Park City Mines Co, v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain 
F< mt is, 2006 I J I ' 35, \ 2 7 1 • '\ 0 P 3d 1200 ( \ varnii ig of "gi ii n consequences" when an 
appellant does not marshal). Alternatively, even if the merits are considered, the totality of 
facts known to Officer Wood at the time of the frisk support a reasonable suspicion that 
defendant w as ai n led and dangerous. 
{1) Defendant Fails to Properly Marshal the i:m n in Sappm't >/' (In1 /^isk. 
Whether a weapons frisk is lawful is "highly fact dependent." State v. Brake, 2004 
I I ^ , 1| 2, MM P. MI 690. Because the inquiry is fact-dependent, defendant is obligated to 
marshal every "scrap of competent evidence" in suppoi t < * f 1 he ti ial ca »ni t' s findings and 
conclusion before he may attack their validity. Chenv.Ste^^ e* " '-"V t 
P.3d 1177. This requires defendant to "play the devil's advocate" and "temporarily remove 
i j'iojuJiv.v> an-.! :u;iy embrace the [prosecutor's] position." Id. at }^ 78 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). : : M^ -. * "tU - ;^ - . .-, >i 
favorable to the trial .«uu; . . uul not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable 
: :IL N n; case" «>r "merely restate or review evidence that points to an alternate finding 
orafindinccont:. > > :»•.••> . . , ; „ , , . .
 ; , anions omitted). Defendant 
must "demonstrate how the court found the facts from the evMorve -!?.•! ; - n • .-. \ y 
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those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence." Id. (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Accord United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35, fflf 25-27. In sum, to meet 
the marshaling requirement, defendant must "ferret out the fatal flaw" in the evidence 
accepted by the trial court. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., SIS P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah 
App. 1991). Here, defendant has failed to do so and this Court should, therefore, refuse to 
consider the merits of his claims. See United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35, f 27. 
For example, defendant asserts that the police faced no inherent danger in arresting 
Gerrish and no specific threats from defendant. See Br.Aplt. at 7-11. To support these 
claims, defendant states that the search warrant "did not allege that Raymon Gerrish was 
trafficking in large amounts of illegal substances or that he was violent or dangerous." 
Br.Aplt. at 5. Gerrish was simply wanted for felony drug possession. Id. Defendant further 
states that Officer Wood did not suspect defendant of any crime or of being armed or 
dangerous. Br.Aplt. at 6. These statements do not fairly reflect the record or adequately 
marshal the facts. 
When properly marshaled, the facts establish that Gerrish was not simply wanted for 
drug possession. He was wanted on a new felony drug possession offense and for 
absconding from AP & P's supervision in connection with a prior conviction (R. 73). A 
neutral magistrate determined that there was probable cause to believe that Gerrish was 
actively concealing himself from the police and that there was reason to believe that other 
individuals were helping him (id.). Aware of the dangers the police faced in trying to arrest 
Gerrish, the police received judicial authorization to approach Cloward's property under 
10 
cover of darkness "for the safety of the officers" (id.). See Add. B (Affidavit). The fair 
inference from il-e-. Ltci> \* :ii:!i«.Krri>h3 a wanted fugitive hiding from the police, was likely 
to flee or fight if the police attempted to arrest him i u i< 11Ii.; i t < ; • t h e i s < :»ii the pi operty might aid 
him. These facts alone establish the inherent dangerousness the police faced in executing the 
search warrant. 
•'..'.'- :v But additional facts, again ignored by defendai it, establish tl latthedangei the officers 
faced escalated once they entered Cloward's home. 
Defendant fails to acknowledge that when the police loudly knocked on Cloward's 
ilnor,, .n mounted iliLir presence several times, and demanded entry, no one responded. 
Compare Statement of Facts, supra, with lir Aplf at c:> <> When ihe police finally entered,. 
they found four people only feet from the door in the single-wide mobile home (R68: 6-7, 
>. - 5). 1 *- ) of the people, Gerrish and Sylvia, were actually "back-peddling" away 
from the police ami fowanls a bedroom w ill) tline paraphernalia in plain \ lew (KoN: <>- /\ 1 N-
Iy). b> Ivia was hysterical, screaming, and not following police orders (JLU.;. • - . • - V\ as 
in the living room where drug paraphernalia was in plain view (R68: 6-7, 15,19). Defendant 
was in . Liwhi/n. --i^;. .^  • drugs were visiok •; RO<N . < THis, at best five police and AP 
&P officers were faced with controlling four suspects, oic> fulion u :K h\ ^erka' •••'• hree 
of whom were male, located in three different rooms in a single-wide mobile home, when it 
was still possible Inai ouiers were hidden in the home or in the nearby RV trailer, and when 
during the initial n iii n ite, it was unclear who was tl le fugit i v e ai id if an> accomplices were 
present. See Statement of Facts, supra. Moreover, based on the fact that the no one inside 
responded when the police loudly demanded entry, it was reasonable to suspect that the 
occupants deliberately positioned themselves throughout the mobile home to better secure 
weapons, destroy drugs, escape, or simply undermine police control of them. See Muehler 
v. Menu, 544 U.S. 93,98-100 (2005); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-705 (1981) 
(recognizing the dangerousness of executing search warrants in homes where multiple 
persons are on the premises). 
Defendant also does not fully recite Officer Wood's expressed concern that defendant 
was armed and dangerous. See Br.Aplt. at 6. Wood testified that when he confronted 
defendant, he did not know"what the situation was in the house" (R68: 27-28, 31). Under 
cross-examination, Wood conceded that defendant followed his command to lay on the floor 
and did not overtly threaten him, but also testified that he believed that defendant could still 
threaten his safety even if handcuffed (id.). See United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 
209-10 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the limited effectiveness of handcuffs in ensuring the 
safety of officers); People v. Thurman, 209 Cal.App.3d 817, 823 (Cal. App. 1989) 
(recognizing that even when a suspect's posture at a given moment is nonthreatening, this 
"does not in any measure diminish the potential for sudden armed violence" created by the 
surrounding circumstances). Most significantly, defendant fails to acknowledge—much less 
marshal—the most salient fact testified to by Officer Wood and accepted by the trial court: 
That at the time of the frisk, the police had not eliminated defendant as the fugitive or an 
accomplice (id.). See Add. A (Trial Court Findings at R. 27). This fact alone fully supports 
a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous. See footnotes 3 &4, supra 
12 
Finally, defendant is correct that the mere presence of drugs and/or drug paraphernalia 
in a hc-Mc uoes not necessarily raise a suspicion thai ,he occupants are armed or dangerous. 
SeeBr.Aplt. at 6-7. But!>. -\ - • facts are i lot so limited 1 1 le dn lgs and paraphernalia in tl lis 
case were in plain view "all over the house/'with the exception of the kitchen (R68: 7, 15, 
1 1 : p : *. See Add. C. Anyone, in the mobile home would have been aware of this open use 
*
 :
"
 l
 oreover, \ v hen the police entei ed, Get i ish w as i lot hiding as he had earlier when 
the confidential informant was on the property; instead, he was free! A ill .:•-.: in defend**'. * 
presence. Coupled with the allegation that persons on the property were lookouts, these facts 
:; i iheir reasonable inferences support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was not a mere 
casual visitor, but w as in concei t w ith Gei rish and the othei s in tl leir crin linal endeav oi s, 
In sum, this Court should refuse to consider the merits of defendant's challenge to the 
validity of the frisk because he has failed to properly marshal the facts. 
^2j Alternatively, Rcttsonuhlc Suspicion Supports ;:•..-. uejendant Was Armed 
and Dangerous. 
In executing a search warrant, the police may lawfully detain, handcuff, and question 
those found on the premises. See Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98-100; Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-
705 (h I co"! nbination, 1 lolding tl lat the police i i my secure premises to be searched by 
detaining, handcuffing, and questioning those on the premises at the time o \ he s-;; -..' r« f n 
appeal, defendant does not challenge his detention or questioning. 
^..KI, dci../^^m argues only that he could not be frisked. See Br.Aplt. at 7-11. 
Defendant's attack ib three-fold I le claii ns that: (1) i n i t st.ii lg a vv anted fugiti\ e inside a 
home is not inherently dangerous; (2) no facts support that he was armed or dangerous; and 
(3) even if reasonable suspicion exists, any dangerousness was negated once he was 
handcuffed. See id. Defendant's claims are without merit based on the facts of this case. 
It is well-accepted that a police officer may frisk (pat down the outer clothing) an 
individual that the officer is "investigating at close range" and suspects is armed and 
dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (as applied to persons being investigated 
on the street). See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (as applied to persons in 
places being searched).6 
The suspicion, of course, must be reasonable, meaning that it must be "supported by 
'specific and articulable facts and rational inferences'" and not amount to a mere "'inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.'" State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 10, 112 P.3d 
507 (quoting respectively United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990), 
and Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). At the same time, it "'need not rule out the possibility of 
innocent conduct.'" Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 10 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 
266, 273 (2002)). Moreover, the decision to frisk should not be judged in hindsight, but 
evaluated in light of the facts "available to the officer at the moment" of the frisk. Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21-22. 
The test is objective. Id. "An action is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, 
regardless of the individual [officer's] state of mind, 'as long as the circumstances, viewed 
6In Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93-94, the Court recognized that persons on searched 
premises may be frisked if reasonable suspicion supports that they are armed and 
dangerous or otherwise connected to the illegal activity being investigated. The Court 
held, however, that it was unlawful to frisk the patrons in the public bar where there was 
no basis to connect them to the illegal activities of the bartender. Id. 
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objectively justify the action.' . The officers' subjective motivation is irrelevant." 
Brigham C ity i >. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1.943, 1948 (2006). AccordMarkland, 2005 UT26,f 11 
(citing State v II iinivif, Yinl! '! W. "H I I ^ P M) V)II \ II ,nr,
 M lt\ i * onseqiu nll> lli-1 
issue is not one of emotion ( whether a specific officer "feared" the suspect), but one of 
reason (whether a "man of reasonable caution" would have a basis to suspect that the suspect 
was ai: =,» .; \ i dangerou -. Are HL Reasonable suspicion does not demand that an officer 
wait for an "overt act ol hob ui i- " Sefoiv fnsk;ne a -i^m • : • ) . ' . : -n •• 
823. Rather, the purpose of a Terry frisk is to disarm suspects before an actual threat of harm 
occurs, Cf. Brigham City, 126 S. Ct. at 1949 (recognizing in a different context that the 
reasonableness re-': i" ^ \ • -1 of tl le Foi u tl i Amendment does not require an < > 11 leer to wait for; 
a blow to be struck: "The role of a peace officer includes preventing \ i« K nv e nn. 1 storing 
order"). 
As previously discussed, the facts, when properly marshaled, fully support the 
dangerousness of the siti lation the officers faced in mlmnu I he hume In tim!
 (nu| arrest 
Gerrish. See Subsection (1), supra. Nevertheless, defendant argues that the court improperly 
relied solely on the inherent dangerousness of the situation and did not properly require an 
individi lal suspicioi I of defendant's dangerousness. See Bi A} •//'. at' ] 11 ' I Tie trial court, 
however, did not rely solely on the inherent dangerousness of the situation i. 
Instead, the court upheld the frisk because "[a]t the time defendant was detained [and 
frisked], it was not known whether he was the subject of the first search warrant" (R. 27).7 
See Add, A. 
Defendant does not acknowledge the court's finding that defendant was still a suspect 
at the time of the frisk . See Subsection (1), supra. Consequently, he establishes no fatal 
error in the finding. 
Instead, citing State v. Warren, 37 P.3d 270 (Utah App. 2001) [ Warren / ] , defendant 
argues that Officer Wood must be subjectively afraid for reasonable suspicion to exist. See 
Br.Aplt. at 9. But Warren / ' s reliance on subjective analysis was rejected in Warren II. 
Warren / /held that an objective standard governs the assessment of reasonable suspicion, 
although an officer's evaluation of the situation, based on his training and experience, may 
support the objective reasonableness of the frisk: 
The totality of the circumstances analysis objectively evaluates all facts before 
the officer at the officer made the decision [to frisk]. The officer, with 
experience and training, is in the best position to evaluate the circumstances 
and determine the reasonableness of a Terry frisk. We recognized that some 
7Some courts have recognized that individuals present during a search of home 
may be frisked based on no more than the inherent dangerousness of the situation. See 
Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 606-07 (2d Cir. 1991); Dashiell v. State, 821 A.2d 
372, 380-86 (Md. App. 2003) (both upholding protective frisks of persons present during 
a search for drugs and evidence of drug sales). See also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 4.9(d) at 710-19 (2004) (discussing judicial split over whether particularized 
reasonable suspicion is always necessary for a frisk conducted during a lawful search of 
premises). That issue need not be decided here, however, because neither the trial court 
below nor the State on appeal relies solely on the inherent dangerousness of the search to 
justify the frisk. Instead, the trial court found and the State asserts that it was reasonable 
to suspect that a fugitive, who is actively hiding with the assistance of lookouts, is armed 
and dangerous. Under the circumstances here, it was also reasonable to suspect that 
defendant was the fugitive or an accomplice. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
Consequently, it was reasonable to suspect that defendant was armed and dangerous. 
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officers may never admit that they feared for their safety. . .. Likewise, other 
officers may always claim they believed a stop was dangerous in order to 
justify a frisk. Nevertheless, an officer's own evaluation of the circumstances 
may provide valuable insight to factor into the objective analysis. How much 
weight this factor is given is a determination for the individual court, though 
a Terry frisk cannot be validated or invalidated based solely on a subjective 
belief because no one factor alone is determinative of reasonableness. 
See Warren II, 2003 UT 36, f 21. The United States and Utah Supreme Courts have since 
reaffirr!0<r!Kf i. M,-^S^: M.,:MU .;;• veins icasonablesuspicion.8 ^^^r/^/raw C//V, I J6 
S. Ct. at 1948; Markland, 2005 UT 26, % 11. 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100, 68 P.3d 1052, is also 
misplaced. In Valdez, this Court held that the police could lawfully detain but not question 
Valdez, w here he \ < ' as asleep in ,: arrestee' . • : JMOKX ..:-- .u rested, but 
Valdez was not otherwise suspected of a crime and did not present a threat to the officers. 
Id. at fflf 2-4 & 20-21. Here, entirely different facts exist. At the time of the frisk, the 
search for itic fugitive was not complete, defendant was still under suspicion, and the scene 
was not secure. Therefore, the dm ILICRMM v .^.» '• N ji . ' i • :•: ;,sipuUM >, e 
Statement of Facts, supra. Moreover, Valdez's holding that a lawfully detained suspect may 
not be questioned while detained is of doubtful validity in light of the United States Supreme 
8Additionally, though ultimately irrelevant, defendant's assertion that Officer 
Wood did not fear defendant is factually incorrect. Officer Wood did not discuss his 
subjective emotions. He simply agreed that defendant complied with his orders and did 
not overtly threaten him (R68: 30-31). At the same time, he testified that he did not know 
what "the situation was inside the house" and did not know what role defendant or the 
others played in the search (R68: 27-31). 
Court's subsequent holding that such questioning is constitutionally permissible. See 
Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98-100. 
Finally, defendant claims—without supporting authority—that the fact that he was 
handcuffed diminished any reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous. See Br.Aplt at 11. 
But as Officer Wood testified, handcuffing did not negate the possibility that defendant was 
still dangerous (R68: 27-28). Indeed, it is widely-recognized that the effectiveness of 
handcuffs is limited: 
Handcuffs are a temporary restraining device; they limit but do not eliminate 
a person's ability to perform various acts. They obviously do not impair a 
person's ability to use his legs and feet, whether to walk, run, or kick. 
Handcuffs do limit a person's ability to use his hands and arms, but the degree 
of the effectiveness of handcuffs in this role depends on a variety of factors, 
including the handcuffed person's size, strength, bone and joint structure, 
flexibility, and tolerance to pain. Albeit difficult, it is by no means impossible 
for a handcuffed person to obtain and use a weapon concealed on his person 
or within lunge reach, and in so doing to cause injury to his intended victim, 
to a bystander, or even to himself. Finally, like any mechanical device, 
handcuffs can and do fail on occasion. 
United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200, 209 (5th Cir. 1993). 
In sum, when the totality of the facts are considered in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's ruling, they establish reasonable suspicion to support the search. See State v. 
Peterson, 2005 UT 17, ffif 3 & 6, 110 P.3d 699 (distinguishing between a permissible 
protective pat-down of a person on the searched premises, and an impermissible subsequent 
search of the suspect's coat brought to him by the police); State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 
1382-83 (Utah 1986) (distinguishing between a permissible protective pat-down of persons 
present during a search and a subsequent full body search requiring probable cause). 
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POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION THAT DRUG PARAPHERNALIA WAS 
IN HIS POCKET SUPPORTS HIS ARREST FOR POSSESSION OF 
PARAPHERNALIA 
After Officer Wood felt a hard object in defendant's pocket during the weapons frisk, 
he asked defendant what it was. Defendant volunteered that it was drug paraphernalia. The 
officer then reached in and removed a hypodermic needle and metal spoon containing 
methamphetamine residue. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
Below, the trial court addressed whether the hard object in defendant's pocket could 
be seized (R. 28). In doing so, the court assumed the frisk was legal and seemed to focus on 
whether the seizure would be justified even if the object did not appear to be a weapon or 
contraband (id.). See Add. A. See also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) 
(addressing limits of plain touch doctrine). On appeal, defendant does not challenge this 
ruling. 
Instead, he argues only that if the frisk is determined to be illegal, any evidence 
derived from the frisk must also be suppressed. See Br.Aplt. at 11-12. Here the derivative 
evidence is defendant's admission that he possessed paraphernalia and the paraphernalia 
itself. 
The State agrees that if the frisk was illegal, any evidence derived from the frisk must 
be suppressed. But as argued in Subsection (2), supra, no illegality occurred here. 
Consequently, the fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine is inapplicable. Instead, as the trial 
court found, defendant's admission that he possessed paraphernalia established probable 
19 
cause for his arrest (R. 28). The seizure of the paraphernalia occurred incident to that arrest. 
See State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App 107, U 11, 69 P-3d 293. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm the 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress and, as a result, his convictions. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
f 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 654 P.2d 740, 743 (Cal. 1982). In 
this case, the decisional process would be significantly aided by oral argument. See Utah R. 
App. P. 29(a)(3). 
Respectfully submitted this /7%^lay of January, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the foregoing brief of 
Plaintiff/Appellee were delivered by [ ] hand [ ^mail to SAMUEL S. BAILEY, 220 East 
200 South, Price, Utah 84501, this /Ittday of January, 2007. 
Christine F. Soltis 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Addendum A 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
1 JAN 3 1 2006 j 
(SteiMClCQiiSl 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
RAYMOND MARQUEZ, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Criminal No. 051700158 
Defendant moved to suppress certain evidence in this matter on September 29, 2005. 
Memoranda of Points and Authorities have been submitted by defense counsel and by the County 
Attorney, and a suppression hearing was conducted November 16, 2005. The Court, having 
reviewed the hearing, and the memoranda, now finds as follows: 
Law enforcement entered a home pursuant to a search warrant on January 29, 2005. No 
evidence has been provided to indicate that the search warrant was invalid, and the Court finds 
it to be a valid search warrant. 
Immediately upon entry into the home, officers saw drug paraphernalia in plain view from 
a position where the officer had the right to be. They secured the residence for officers' safety and 
to preserve evidence and immediately sent officers to get another search warrant. Defendant and 
others were lawfully detained, patted down and cuffed while the first search warrant was being 
executed and the second search warrant was being sought. At the time defendant was detained, 
it was not known whether he was the subject of the first search warrant. 
When defendant was patted down for officer safety, officer felt a bulge in his pocket. The 
officer was justified in patting down the defendant, and also justified in inquiring as to what the 
bulge in the pocket was. Defendant volunteered that it was paraphernalia. The officers then had 
probable cause to remove the contents of the pocket for officer safety and to preserve evidence. 
The pocket yielded a needle, which could be used as a weapon against the officer, particularly if 
it was infected with a communicable disease. 
Even if the officer safety did not justify the search of the pocket, defendant's statement that 
the pocket contained illegal contraband provided the officer with probable cause to perform the 
search and to continue detainment and arrest. Upon arrest the contraband would have been 
inevitably discovered either by a search incident to arrest, or a later inventory search. It is 
therefore clear that the officer had probable cause to search defendant's pocket. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: That the defendant's 
suppression motion is denied and the contents of the defendant's pocket are admissible at trial. 
Dated this 30th day of January, 2006 
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Addendum B 
Addendum B 
( Firm i 
•HELPER MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT f ^==H 
•CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH I 
'SEARCH WARRANT C 
I FEB - 2 2003I 
FILED.-
• TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
• Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by: S. TRE1 
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that: 
SEP " 7 /00b I 
'SEJJHMWISI 
• On the premise(s) of: 
70 west 9th North, Helper, Utah, House is a single wide mobile home, two bedroom, front 
room, kitchen, and one bathroom. Home has one enclosed porch which is attached to the 
single wide mobile home on the north west corner of the home, with one detached shed 
located on the north side of the home. The single wide mobile home is gray in color with 
the front door facing to the West. One dirt driveway on the west side of the home with 
entrance from the south side of the home which is accessed from 900 North. A check of 
utilities with Helper City shows the utilities in the name of Shawn Cloward as of 
01/29/2005., 
• In the vehicle(s) parked at the above residence described as: 
1991 Toyota Tercel: White, UTAH 221MWU, VIN# JT2EL43B7M0016504, 2 door 
passenger vehicle, 
1 late model Motor Home with cab over, yellow in color with two brown stripes parked on 
the south side of main residence (70 West 9th North). 
• In the City of HELPER, County of CARBON, State of UTAH, there is now being possessed or 
concealed certain property (Wanted Person) or evidence described as: 
Subject Raymon Robert Gerrish, DOB 09/25/1982, SS# 528396642, 519M, 151 lbs, Hazel eyes, 
Brown hair, Utah Driver's License Number 168871424 
Which property (Wanted Person) or evidence: 
Raymon Robert Gerrish, DOB 09/25/1982, SS# 528396642, 5'9", 151 lbs, Hazel eyes, Brown 
hair, Utah Driver's License Number 168871424: Wanted for Third Degree Felony 
Possession/Use of Controlled Substance - State of Utah, Department of Corrections, Adult 
Probation and Parole - Fugitive. 
MANDED 
To make a search of the above named or described person(s), premise(s) and vehicle(s) for the herein 
above described person, property or evidence, and if you find the same, or any part thereof, to bring it 
forthwith before me at the, County of CARBON, State of UTAH, or retain such property in your 
custody subject to the order of this court. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME 
This ^ f day of ^^^J^'XAA.^I 
IN THE HELPER MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT, 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SERVED: 
Date: <9|/ffi loS 
Time: 
By: £ . .{fjjf /k&A 
/ 
HELPER MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That the AFFIANT has reason to believe that: 
That on the premise(s) known as: 
70 west 9th North, Helper, Utah: House is a single wide mobile home, two bedroom, front room, kitchen, and 
one bathroom. Home has one enclosed porch which is attached to the single wide mobile home on the north 
west corner of the home, with one detached shed located on the north side of the home. The single wide 
mobile home is gray in color with the front door facing to the West. One dirt driveway on the west side of 
the home with entrance to the driveway from the south side of the home which is accessed from 900 North. 
A check of utilities with Helper City shows the utilities in the name of Shawn Cloward as of 01/29/2005. 
That in the vehicle(s) parked at the above residence described as: 
1991, Toyota, Tercel, White, UTAH 221MWU, VIN# JT2EL43B7M0016504, 2 door passenger vehicle 
1 late model Motor Home with cab over, yellow in color with two brown stripes 
In the City of HELPER, County of CARBON, State of UTAH, there is now certain property (Wanted Person) or 
evidence described as: 
• Subject Raymon Robert Gerrish, DOB 09/25/1982, SS# 528396642, 5'9", 151 lbs, Hazel eyes, Brown hair, 
Utah Driver's License Number 168871424 
• The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant are: 
• Your AFFIANT, Officer S. Trent Anderson is a Police Officer with the Helper City Police Department 
and has been employed as a Police Officer for the past five years. Your AFFIANT is currently assigned 
to the patrol division. Your AFFIANT graduated from the Utah Police Officer Standards and Training 
Academy in January of 2000. Your AFFIANT has attended the following in-service training classes 
which involves hundreds of hours: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Drug Interdiction, Stolen 
Vehicle Apprehension, Sexual Assault Investigations, Instructor Development, Incident Response to 
Terrorist Bombings, Hazardous Materials Awareness, and Introduction to basic drug intelligence and 
analysis. 
• Subject Raymon Robert Gerrish, DOB 09/25/1982, SS# 528-39-6642,5'9", 151 lbs, Hazel eyes, Brown 
hair, Utah Driver's License Number 168871424. On 01/29/05, CI contacted our agency and advised 
that CI observed Raymon Gerrish several times on 01/29/05 attempting to conceal himself at 70 West 
9th North in Helper, Utah and in the motor home. Utah Statewide warrants show an active warrant for 
the arrest of Raymon Robert Gerrish in the amount of $5,000.00 issued by the 7th District Court in Price, 
Utah, warrant # 981124276 - OTN 15665474. State of Utah, Department of Corrections also has 
Search Warrant Affidavit - Page 1 
Raymon R. Gerrish listed as a FUGITIVE with their agency. 
Further grounds for issuance of a search warrant are attached hereto and incorporated herein. 
Your AFFIANT has personally contacted the State of Utah, Department of Corrections, Adult 
Probation and Parole - Agent Jeff Wood and confirmed that subject Raymon R. Gerrish is still 
and active Fugitive with their agency. Your AFFIANT has also personally checked the State 
of Utah, statewide warrants, and confirmed an active warrant for subject Raymon R. Gerrish. 
Your AFFIANT has personal knowledge of this residence and personal knowledge that Shawn 
Cloward is the owner of the residence. Your AFFIANT further personally checked the 
residence and observed the description and vehicle's at the residence. 
WHEREFORE, the AFEIANT ppays that the search warrant be issued for the seizure of said items at 
any tinie4ay-^rni^^dW reasons: 
It is currently nightnm#ahd therms a need to serve the warrant before daylight for Officer Safety 
r£as<^^ information relating to 70 West 9th North in Helper, Utah with 
illegal drug activity. The warrant for Raymon R. Gerrish has been issued for Illegal Possession/Use 
of Controlled Substance - Felony 3. Subject Raymon R. Gerrish is also listed by the State of Utah, 
Department of Corrections as a FUGITIVE. It has been your AFFIANTS experience that persons 
using and or distributing illegal controlled substances pose a higher threat of safety to Law 
Enforcement therefore by allowing Law Enforcement night time entry into the home or vehicles aids 
in greater degree of cover and the safety to all officers involved in order to effect a lawful and safe 
arrest. 
Your AFFIANT has received information that there are suspects acting as lookouts at this location 
and for the safety of officers, a nighttime approach is needed. Presently, the two referenced vehicles 
are parked at the above residence. The CI told AFFIANT that CI saw Gerrish at both the residence 
and motor home on 01/29/2005. Officers making entry to the residence would be easily seen by the 
occupants of this motor home. 
• This affidavit was reviewed by ATTORNEY GENE STRATE of the CARBON COUNTY ATTORNEY'S 
OFFICE. 
*U&<^ 
AFFIANT, Officer S. Trent Anderson 
Search Warrant Affidavit - Page 2 
• SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 
XxpCL^kzJ--^ 
IN THE HELPER KICNWl'KE JUSTICE COURT, 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Search Warrant Affidavit - Page 3 
Addendum C 
Addendum C 
•HELPER MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT 
•CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH FILED 
•SEARCH WARRANT 
FEB - 2 2005 
*> sfflliBfeh 
TO.KYPEACEOPmCER.NTHBSTATEC™ » « ! ! $ 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by: S. TRENT AM)^SON7Tam *-*-« 
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that: 
On the premise(s) of: 
70 west 9th North, Helper, Utah: House is a single wide mobile home, two bedroom, front room, 
kitchen, and one bathroom. Home has one enclosed porch which is attached to the single wide 
mobile home on the north west corner of the home, with one detached shed located on the north side 
of the home. The single wide mobile home is gray in color with the front door facing to the West. 
One dirt driveway on the west side of the home with entrance to the driveway from the south side of 
the home which is accessed from 900 North. A check of utilities with Helper City shows the 
utilities in the name of Shawn Cloward as of 01/29/2005. 
In the vehicle(s) parked at the residence described as: 
1972 Eldorado Motor Corporation, Model: Ecoline, Style: Motorized Home, White in color, 
bearing UTAH 744MWV (which license plate is registered in the State of Utah to a different 
vehicle), VIN# E34GHM00675, registered in the State of Utah to: Paul A. Pearson with a 
registered address of 899 North 750 West #459 Price, Utah. 
In the City of HELPER, County of CARBON, State of UTAH, there is now being possessed or 
concealed certain property or evidence described as: 
MARIJUANA, a green leafy substance in dried form. 
• Materials used to package marijuana, specifically, plastic sandwich bags. 
• Materials for using marijuana: 
1.Cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with adhesive on one side, 
2.Pipes, used to smoke marijuana, 
3.Roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being smoked. 
• Personal notes, records or narcotic transactions, listing names, dates, amounts sold. 
METHAMPHETAMINE, a yellowish white powdery substance. 
• Materials for packaging methamphetamine, specifically small plastic baggies. 
• Materials for using methamphetamine, including hollow tubes for snorting 
• 
methamphetamine, small spoons for snorting methamphetamine, mirrors for holding 
methamphetamine while being snorted, razor blades for cutting methamphetamine into 
lines, 
• Scales for weighing methamphetamine. 
• Cut, substance used to dilute the methamphetamine. 
SUSPECTED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
Which property or evidence: 
Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
Is evidence of illegal conduct. 
COMMANDED 
To make a search of the above named or described person(s), premise(s) and vehicle(s) for the herein 
above described person, property or evidence, and if you find the same, or any part thereof, to bring it 
forthwith before me at the, County of CARBON, State of UTAH, or retain such property in your 
custody subject to the order of this court. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME 
this A± 
SERVED: 
DATE:_ 
Time: 
LL 
Byt J / ' !A#\k jlAA/A 
fe^Z^ 
'««£«£«* 
HELPER MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That the AFFIANT has reason to believe that: 
That on the premise(s) known as: 
70 west 9th North, Helper, Utah: House is a single wide mobile home, two bedroom, front room, kitchen, and 
one bathroom. Home has one enclosed porch which is attached to the single wide mobile home on the north 
west corner of the home, with one detached shed located on the north side of the home. The single wide 
mobile home is gray in color with the front door facing to the West. One dirt driveway on the west side of 
the home with entrance to the driveway from the south side of the home which is accessed from 900 North. 
A check of utilities with Helper City shows the utilities in the name of Shawn Cloward as of 01/29/2005. 
That in the vehicle(s) parked at the residence described as: 
1972 Eldorado Motor Corporation, Model: Ecoline, Style: Motorized Home, White in color, bearing UTAH 
744MWV (which license plate is registered in the State of Utah to a different vehicle), VIN# 
E34GHM00675, registered in the State of Utah to: Paul A. Pearson with a registered address of 899 North 
750 West #459 Price, Utah. 
In the City of HELPER, County of CARBON, State of UTAH, there is now certain property or evidence described 
as: 
• MARIJUANA, a green leafy substance in dried form. 
• • Materials used to package marijuana, specifically, plastic sandwich bags. 
• • Materials for using marijuana: 
• 1. Cigarette papers, small sheets of flammable paper with adhesive on one side, 
• 2. Pipes, used to smoke marijuana, 
• 3. Roach clips, used to hold a marijuana cigarette while being smoked. 
• • Personal notes, records or narcotic transactions, listing names, dates, amounts sold. 
• METHAMPHETAMINE, a yellowish white powdery substance. 
• • Materials for packaging methamphetamine, specifically small plastic baggies. 
• • Materials for using methamphetamine, including hollow tubes for snorting methamphetamine, 
small spoons for snorting methamphetamine, mirrors for holding methamphetamine while being 
snorted, razor blades for cutting methamphetamine into lines, 
• • Scales for weighing methamphetamine. 
• • Cut, substance used to dilute the methamphetamine. 
• SUSPECTED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
• That said property or evidence: 
• • Was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
• • Is evidence of illegal conduct. 
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• The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrant are: 
Your AFFIANT, Officer S. Trent Anderson is a Police Officer with the Helper City Police Department and 
has been employed as a Police Officer for the past five years. Your AFFIANT is currently assigned to the 
patrol division. Your AFFIANT graduated from the Utah Police Officer Standards and Training Academy 
in January of 2000. Your AFFIANT has attended the following in-service training classes which involves 
hundreds of hours: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Drug Interdiction, Stolen Vehicle Apprehension, 
Sexual Assault Investigations, Instructor Development, Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings, Hazardous 
Materials Awareness, and Introduction to basic drug intelligence and analysis. 
On 01/29/05 at approx. 2124 hours, The Helper City Police Department served a search warrant on 70 West 
9th North in Helper, Utah for a wanted person. Officers from Helper City, Carbon County Sheriffs Office, 
and Adult Probation and Parole assisted in the search warrant. Upon executing the search warrant, wanted 
person (Raymon R. Gerrish) was located and placed under arrest for an active statewide warrant in the 
amount of $5,000.00 in which he was also listed as a fugitive by Adult Probation and Parole. While 
securing the residence, I observed in plain view (north bedroom) two suspected methamphetamine pipes and 
observed on suspected marijuana bong (front room floor). Two hypodermic needles, two bags of small clear 
plastic bags, and one spoon with suspected methamphetamine residue were located on suspect Raymon 
Gerrish. One hypodermic needle and one spoon with suspected methamphetamine residue was located on 
Raymond C. Marquez. Suspected drug paraphernalia and suspected methamphetamine residue was located 
(plain view) in the residence upon executing the search warrant. In your AFFIANTS experience, illegal drug 
parphernalia and-controlled substance can and have been stored in vehicles. 
-j-, ~~ FIANT prays that the search warrant be issued for the seizure of said items^at any tjl 
it due-to the following reasons: ^ ^ 
It is currently nighttime, and there is a need to serve the warrant before daylight to secure important 
evidence in this case that may provide immediate information to further your AFFIANTS investigation 
during the night. On 01/29/05 at approx. 2124 hrs., Helper City Police Department, along with the 
Carbon County Sheriffs Office and Adult Probation and Parole executed a search warrant at 70 West 
9th North for a wanted person. While executing the search warrant, suspected drug paraphernalia and 
suspected methamphetamine residue was located in plain view in the north bedroom and front room 
of the residence. Other suspected drug paraphernalia was also located on one Raymond Marquez and 
one Raymon Gerrish. At this time, we wish to continue without delay in searching for additional 
controlled substances and/or drug paraphernalia. 
This affidavit was reviewed by ATTORNEY GENE STRATE of the CARBON COUNTY 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. 
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^hi y4^^/ ^^c^^y-
AFFTANT^g Trent AntWcnn 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 
IN THE HELPER MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT, 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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